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THUMBS IN THE DIKE: PROCEDURES TO CONTAIN
TUE FLOOD OF PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATIONt
JOSEPHINE Y. KING*
I.

INTRODUCTION

IF calendar

congestion in the metropolitan areas of New York State is a
product of tort litigation and its affinity for juries, and if negligence
claims arise primarily from motor vehicle mishaps,1 then perhaps it is a
disutility to invest intellectual effort in honing the procedural tools of
adjudication. Why not simply sever this hypertrophic limb from the
general body of litigation and assign it to another forum, e.g., arbitration
or a special agency such as the Workmen's Compensation Board? 2 The
answer is not so simple and, in the opinion of many judges and lawyers,
such a solution is hardly desirable. Large segments of both groups, although not necessarily for the same reasons, would prefer to preserve the
jurisdiction of the civil courts over meritorious negligence claims. 3
Improving the "delivery system" in personal injury litigation is a goal
t This article is based upon a study commissioned by the Judicial Conference of the
State of New York. It will be published in the Sixteenth Annual Report of the Judicial
Conference (1971) under the title: "Accelerating Personal Injury Litigation: The Offer to
Compromise and Other Procedures."
The author gratefully acknowledges the cooperation of the Honorable Frank A. Gulotta,
Administrative Judge of Nassau County; the Honorable Edward Thompson, Administrative
Judge of the Civil Court of the City of New York; and other distinguished jurists of the
supreme and civil courts. The study was undertaken at the suggestion of Professor Adolf
Homburger, Chairman of the CPLR Advisory Committee, to whom the author owes a
special debt as teacher and former colleague. Michael McEneney and William A. Bulman, Jr,
Assistant Counsels of the judicial Conference, contributed freely of their insight and
knowledge as the study developed. The Hofstra Law Librarian, Professor Eugene Wyp)s-i,
spared no effort in procuring documents and materials essential to research of the offer to
compromise. If, despite the invaluable assistance of jurists, administrators and legal scholars,
the study displays errors, omissions or other deficiencies, the responsibility for such shortcomings devolves solely upon the author.
* Associate Professor of Law, School of Law, Hofstra University; Visiting Professor,
Downstate Medical Center, State University of New York.
1. The number of vehicles registered in the United States in 1968 was 101,048,000, of
which 83,281,000 were private cars. In New York total motor vehicle registration was
6,310,000, private cars numbering 5,616,000 of that totaL There were 103,172,0 licensed
drivers in the United States in 1968 and 7,903,000 in New York State. Bureau of the Census,
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 550 (1969).
2. See Hofstadter, A Proposed Automobile Accident Compensation Plan, 328 Annals 53
'(1960).
3. For a negative reaction to automobile compensation plans, see Temp. Comm'n on
the Courts, Recommendations Respecting Calendar Congestion and Delay, 19S7 N.Y. Legis.
Doe. No. 6(c), at 45.
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which cannot be solely or primarily pursued on a quantitative plane.
Comprehensive revisions of the present system of compensation and
more limited proposals directed toward specific malfunctions of that
system have burgeoned in recent years.4 Books, law review articles, insurance industry publications and statements at legislative hearings deal
in varying degrees with the substantive problem of whether fault should
remain the criterion of compensation. Institution of partial or total nofault plans, coupled with tort liability exemptions and emphasis upon
first-party coverage, might well affect the character and incidence of
personal injury lawsuits. Such a decision, however, ought to be made on
substantive grounds. While a high priority must be assigned to the task
of perfecting judicial administration, we have come to recognize that
the issues surrounding personal injury compensation are more substantive than procedural-in fact, more social than legal.
Assuming that a proposal to abolish tort liability5 or to exile personal
injury cases to another tribunal would not survive the state legislature,
what affirmative but less drastic attacks upon "systemic delay" are
feasible? The interval between the date on which the plaintiff brings his
action and the date when final disposition is achieved can be contracted
in relatively few ways: "i[T]he time required for the disposition of cases
can be shortened; the number of cases requiring official disposition can
be reduced by affecting the settlement ratio; or the amount of available
judge time can be increased, either by directly adding judges or by increasing somehow the efficiency with which the current judge power
is now used."" This study will be primarily concerned with the second
of these three approaches, i.e., affecting the settlement ratio.
4. See, e.g., ABA Special Comm. on Auto. Accident Reparations Rep. (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Reparations Rep.]; American Ins. Ass'n, Report of the Special Comm. to Study
and Evaluate the Keeton-O'Connell Basic Protection Plan and Automobile Accident Reparations (1968); W. Blum & H. Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem
(1965); A. Conard, J. Morgan, R. Pratt, C. Voltz & R. Bombaugh, Automobile Accident
Costs and Payments (1964); Connecticut Ins. Dep't, A Program for Automobile Insurance
and Accident Benefits Reform (1969); Defense Research Institute, Responsible Reform
(1969); A. Ehrenzweig, "Full-Aid" Insurance for the Traffic Victim (1954); L. Green,
Traffic Victims-Tort Law and Insurance (1958); R. Keeton & J. O'Connell, Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim (1965); N.Y. Dep't of Ins., Automobile Insurance. . . For
Whose Benefit? (1970); Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status, Causes and Proposed Remedies, in H. Jones, The Courts, the Public, and the Law Explosion (1965); King, The Insurance Industry and Compensation Plans, 43 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1137 (1969).
5. This assumption will be put to the test as the legislature of New York considers the
compulsory, no-fault insurance proposal recommended by the Governor in February 1970.
See N.Y. Dep't of Insurance, Automobile Insurance. . . For Whose Benefit? (1970). See
also Proposed Addition to the N.Y. Ins. Law §§ 670-76, N.Y. Assembly A6133, 193d Sess.
(1970).
6. H. Zeisel, H. Kalven & B, Buchholz, Delay in the Court 5 (,959),
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II. PAST AND PRESENT TECHNIQUES TO CONTROL THE CALENDAR
Examples of procedures which divert a portion of civil actions from
the courts entirely or by referral are Pennsylvania's compulsory arbitra-

tion plan for cases involving damages under three thousand dollars, T and
the auditor system in Massachusetts.8 In nonfinal referrals in Massachusetts, and in arbitration awards in Pennsylvania, the parties may seek a
retrial. The considerations advanced by Professor Rosenberg and his
associates in studying the two procedures must, however, be carefully
weighed by any jurisdiction contemplating their adoption.o
In Philadelphia, there appears to be general satisfaction with the
operation of the Pennsylvania plan. In the first ten years under compulsory arbitration, more than sixty thousand cases were processed."
Its simplicity, promptness and low cost (about sixty-two dollars per
case) have been noted. 1 Moreover, the rate of appeal from arbitrators'
decisions is estimated to be as low as five per cent." In a committee report of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, however,
the Pennsylvania system was not recommended for adoption in New
York.' Contrast in the size of the population served by Philadelphia and
New York City courts, the fact that New York claims generally exceed
three thousand dollars, absence of compulsory automobile insurance in
Pennsylvania, and the large volume of minor controversies accommodated by the Small Claims Part of the Civil Court of the City of New
York were cited as distinctions which militated against the transplanta4
tion of the Pennsylvania plan to this state.1
Nevertheless, the New York legislature in 1970 enacted compulsory
arbitration for money claims not exceeding three thousand dollars for a
three-year trial period."5 The statute reposes authority in the Judicial
7. Pa. Stat. Ann. fit. 5, § 30 (1963), as amended, (Supp. 1970). See Rosenberg & Schubin,
Trial by Lawyer: Compulsory Arbitration of Small Claims in Pennsylvania, 74 Harv. L. Rev.
448 (1961); Zal, Philadelphia's Municipal Court Eliminates Backlogs, 47 A.BAJ. 1101
(1961).
8. Rosenberg & Chanin, Auditors in Massachusetts as Antidotes for Delayed Civil Courts,
110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 27 (1962).
9. See Rosenberg & Schubin, supra note 7, at 466-71.
10. County Court of Philadelphia, Compulsory Arbitration Division, Statistical Report
and Explanatory Remarks Pertaining to Compulsory Arbitration, First Decade, 1958 to
1967, at 8.
11. Id. at 4, 8.
12. Ryan, Arbitration Cuts Philadelphia Backlog, 10 For the Defense 42 (1969).
13. NYCBA, Comm. on State Courts of Superior Jurisdiction, Variations on the Pennsylvania System: Partial Elimination of Jury Trials in Civil Cases Through Compulsory Arbitration Before Panels of Lawyers, 22 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 638, 640, 643-44 (1967).
14. Id. at 640.
15. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 213 (McKinney 1968), as amended, [1970] N.Y. Laws ch. 1004.
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Conference to promulgate necessary rules. Initially at least, the program
will not be statewide but will be tested in the City Court of Rochester.
Its success or failure there may well influence the continuation and extension of the system to other parts of the state.
Another useful device, utilized in an attempt to reduce the number
and duration of trials for those claims which have entered the court
system, is the pretrial conference. In some jurisdictions, such as New
Jersey, the purpose of a pretrial conference is to shape and refine the
controversy so that a better quality trial process results.1" Thorough
exploration of the issues might conduce parties to settle without trial, or
shorten the trial if one ensued. A study of the New Jersey pretrial conference, however, revealed that the procedure did
not result in fewer
17
cases being tried or in a reduction of trial time.
In New York, where the objective of the pretrial conference is settlement,18 one can review statistics demonstrating that such conferences
do dispose of many cases. The system, however, is not a panacea for
court delay. It absorbs an appreciable amount of judge time and might
be prohibitively time consuming if the practice approached the federal
and New Jersey standards.
Another device which might achieve economies in court time is the
split trial, in which the issues of liability and damages are separated 1?
If there is a judgment for the defendant on the issue of liability, the
trial on damages is avoided. If there is a judgment for plaintiff on the
issue of liability, the defendant's self interest might dictate settlement,
and again the second trial could be avoided. From a study based on
experience developed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Professor Zeisel determined that "in personal
injury jury trials separation saves trial time of the magnitude of about
20 per cent."20 Another result emerged, however, which cautions against
indiscriminately embracing the separation of issues as a method of re16. M. Rosenberg, The Pretrial Conference and Effective Justice 8-9 (1964).
17. Id. at 68-89.
18. See the detailed suggestions for refining pretrial hearings in Temp. Comm'n on the
Courts, Recommendations Respecting Calendar Congestion and Delay, 1957 N.Y. Legis.
Doc. No. 6(c), at 18, 25-38.
19. To avoid postponement of personal injury trials by attorneys seeking to delay a

final judgment (either as plaintiff's counsel patiently waiting for the entire brood of Injuries
to hatch, or as defense counsel loathe to relinquish hard cash prematurely) some continental
systems have provided for split trials. If liability is found in the first proceeding, Interim

damages are awarded. The second stage represents a final assessment of plaintiff's Injuries
after they have matured. Fleming, Damages: Capital or Rent?, 19 U. Toronto L.J. 295, 304
(1969).
20. Zeisel & Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis, 76 Earv. L.
Rev. 1606, 1619 (1963).
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ducing trial time. In the separated trials, the proportion of defendants'
verdicts was substantially higher than that statistically established for
the usual trial procedure. 2'
Studies of the experience of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New Jersey
and Illinois suggest no convincing solution to the delay problem in
other states. It is apparent, however, that any court system encompassing large metropolitan areas must devote energy and imagination to
coping with the tort backlog. Since knowledge of the remedies which
have been pursued sharpens the ability to evaluate new recommendations, it is instructive to examine the responses of the overburdened civil
courts of New York. -2
The recent history of the struggle in New York to break the logjam
is chronicled in the Annual Reports of the Judicial Conference. The first
Report, dated 1956,3 noted the delays - in tort jury cases for the supreme court as of December 31, 1955. Queens County had a delay of 48
months; New York County, 44 months; Bronx, 43 months; Nassau, 36
months; Westchester, 32 months; Kings, 31 months; and Suffolk, 28
months.'- In the latest compilation of statistics, the following figures
were reported: Rockland (which had a 20-month delay in 1955), 45
months; Bronx, 44 months; Queens, 32 months; Dutchess, 30 months;
New York, 39 months; Westchester, 33 months; Nassau, 31 months;
Kings, 29 months; and Suffolk, 20 months.20 Incoming jury cases for
the judicial year ending June 30, 1969 totaled 40,210 for the supreme
court, as contrasted with 37,072 for the year ending June 30, 1 9 5 5 .2T
The early Reports signal a concern with the well-entrenched pattern
of delay, while subsequent Reports unfold the many-faceted efforts to
improve established procedures and gain new perspectives on suggested
reforms. Calendar practice, pretrial conference, trial without a jury or
21. Id. at 1617.
22. See Tolman, Court Administration: Housekeeping for the Judiciary, 328 Annals 105

(1960).
23. New York Judicial Conference, First Annual Report (1956) [hereinafter cited by
volume and year as Ann. Rep.].
24. '])elay for statistical purposes is considered by the Judicial Conference as delay owing
solely to calendar congestion of over six months in tort cases and over two months in com-

mercial and equity cases." Id. at 18.
"The Judicial Conference considers that delay exists, for statistical purposes, when the
period of time required for matters to be reached for trial once the note of issue has been
filed, is more than two months in commercial and equity actions and more than six months
in tort actions." 14 id. at 213 (1969).
25. Addendum following 1 id. at 18 (1956).
26. 15 id. at A140 (1970).
27. Id. at A139; 1 id. at 21 (1956).
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with a six member jury, simplified procedures 8 and court reorganization 29 recur as topics of study throughout the nineteen fifties and sixties.
The readiness rule adopted by the appellate division of the supreme
court in New York and Bronx counties became effective on January 1,
1957.11 This rule required filing a certification that the action was ready
for immediate trial before a case could be assigned to a trial calendar,
i.e., discovery procedures, depositions and settlement conferences must
have been completed. Within six months of its effective date, more than
two thousand pending cases were dropped from the calendar for failure
to comply with this rule, and the intake of new cases declined sharply. 1
Unfortunately, however, this salutary development proved to be a temporary respite rather than a sustained reversal. 2
In 1956, the first and second departments launched a summer trial
program to reduce the number of pending jury cases. Only three courts
participated,"3 and the results were modest." When a summer session was
arranged for 1957, however, it failed to gain support from the bar. A
mere handful of cases reached disposition.",
The "blockbuster" technique was instituted by the first department
in 1958.30 A number of trial justices were assigned for a period of
months to the special task of clearing up cases which had aged on the
calendar, and their efforts produced good results. The procedure has
been continued in the supreme courts and was adopted by the Civil
Court of the City of New York in 1963.'T
The civil court had also developed a system of utilizing law secretaries
to pre-try small property claims. The secretaries' function was to achieve
settlement or a consent of the parties to arbitrate. Although the format
of the program has been altered-law secretaries no longer pre-try cases
-the pretrial settlement of small property claims in New York County
has proceeded with notable success under the direction of one of the
judges of the civil court.
28.

See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3031 (McKinney 1963); 7 Ann. Rep. 48 (1962); 3 id. at 102-18

(1958).
29.

See 7 Ann. Rep. 37-38 (1962) ; 4 id. at 86-103 (1959).

30. See 3 id. at 28-29 (1958). The statement of readiness became a requirement in the
Supreme Court of Erie County on January 1, 1957, id. at 39, and in the second depart.
ment with the March 1957 term, id. at 49.
31. See id. at 28-29.
32.

See 7 id. at 45-46 (1962) ; 5 id. at 24 (1960) ; 4 id. at 47 (1959).

33. The participating courts were: Supreme Court in New York County; City Court
in New York County; Municipal Court in Bronx County. 3 id. at 31 (1958).
34. Id. at 32.

35. See 4 id. at 12-13 (1959).
36.
37.

Id. at 27-28.
See 11 id. at 67-68 (1966).
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A recent innovation in the civil court is the system of conference and
assignment. Judges are scheduled to work in teams of three; the conference judge calls about thirty-five cases each day and attempts to
achieve disposition of the controversies without trial. If the case cannot
be settled at conference, it is assigned for trial before one of the assignment judges, who may proceed immediately to try the case if another
matter is not pending before him. The case does not return to a general
calendar or require clerical processing; it is either disposed of at conference or tried. In its first few months of operation, the conference and
assignment system has substantially eroded the congestion in civil court.
Thirty percent of the backlog was disposed of in the first six months of
1970, and the time between the notice of trial and the appearance of the
parties' representatives before the conference judge has been reduced
for tort jury cases in all counties of New YorkY8 The conference and
assignment system merits close attention and analysis, particularly as
statistical data and experience develop.

The expense, delay and trial complications engendered by calling
opposing medical experts as witnesses in personal injury actions
prompted the First Department of the Appellate Division to establish a
Medical Report Office in New York County in 1952V' At any time before the end of a trial, a judge may refer a personal injury case to this
office, which maintains a confidential list of physicians designated by the
major medical societies. Upon receiving the reference, the Office selects
a doctor to examine the plaintiff and submit a report, without cost to
either party. About two hundred cases come to the Medical Report
Office each year, of which eighty per cent are settled without trial."' The
merit of the system lies in the fact that evaluation of personal injuries
can be made by an impartial, court-appointed expert-a service which
is particularly valuable in complicated cases otherwise productive of
highly technical and divergent medical testimony.
At the same time that judges and court administrators have devoted
their efforts to achieving speedier justice, state legislators have introduced many bills affecting personal injury litigation. One of the more
frequent legislative proposals in recent years relates to interest on per38.

During the period January 1, 1970 to July 1, 1970, the time from notice of trial

to conference was reduced in New York County from 24 to 18 months; in Bronx from 38 to
20 months; in Kings from 51 to 29 months; in Queens from 41 to 30 months; and in
Richmond from 12 to 6 months. Telephone interview with the Honorable Edward Thompson,
Administrative Judge of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Sept. 2, 1970.
39. See 4 Ann. Rep. 113-24 (1959). See also NYCBA, Special Comm. on the Medical
Expert Testimony Project, Impartial Medical Testimony (1956).
40. Interview with Samuel B. Grossman, Clerk of the Medical Report Office in the
Supreme Court, New York County, in New York City, May 28, 1969.
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sonal injury claims.41 It is an anomaly of the common law that interest

from the time of the breach or damage has been recognized in contract

and property claims4 2 but not for personal injuries (with the exception
of wrongful death actions) .4 Imposition of interest charges from the

date of personal injury or from the date an action is commenced must
be considered under two heads: (1) the logical basis for analogizing the
"liquidated" damages in personal injury claims (e.g., medical expenses;

lost wages) to a contract debt which has not been discharged on the
agreed date; and (2) the effect which liability for pre-judgment in-

terest might have on the tortfeasor's incentive to settle.
With reference to the first point, it may be argued that the victim of
an accident experiences losses as genuine, if not so easily ascertainable,
as the contract creditor. Both are deprived of the use of money which
would have been available but for the acts of the defendant. The argu-

ment encounters more difficulty, however, when the indeterminate elements of damages in personal injury actions become a possible predicate
for pre-judgment interest. 4 It would be impracticable to charge the jury
with segregating past and future, physical and psychic damages. There-

fore, if interest on the whole verdict is to run from some pretrial date,
the decision to change the law must rest on equitable grounds.
41. See McLaughlin, Interest on Personal Injury Claims, 1966 N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 65[l],
at 415; Recommendation of the Law Revision Commission, Award of Interest on Causes
of Action for Personal Injury, 1966 N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 65[1], at 409.
42. "[Interest was initially added to a cause of action only when the debtor had agreed
to pay interest. It was next allowed on liquidated contract claims . .

.

. The transition

from interest on liquidated debts to interest on unliquidated claims had to await the
abandonment of the view that interest is a penalty to be inflicted on tardy debtors. With
the acceptance of the idea that interest is an award for the creditor's loss of use of the
money, there began a gradual progression from interest on all unliquidated contract debts ...
to interest on some tort claims resulting in property damage ...and concluding with the
award of interest as a matter of right on all claims for property damage ....
"The [Law Revision) Commission believes that interest should be awarded as a matter
of right in all personal injury actions." Recommendation of the Law Revision Commission,
supra note 41, at 409-10. The present provision, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5001, has not been
amended to conform to this recommendation.
43. N.Y. Est., Powers & Trusts Law § 5-4.3 (McKinney 1967). Compensatory damnges
in wrongful death actions are derived from the pecuniary loss suffered by the survivors,
and such damages include future losses.
A few states allow interest on personal injury actions. See McLaughlin, supra note 41,
at 439-40.
44. See Recommendation of the Law Revision Commission, supra note 41, at 410. The
Law Revision Commission recognized that pre-judgment interest for personal injury claims
would entail interest on future losses such as loss of earning capacity and future pain and
suffering, but notes that in contract cases "interest is presently awarded from the date of
the breach, even though part of the verdict includes future losses." Id.
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The contention that the defendant-insurance carrier will accelerate its
efforts to settle if confronted with the spectre of mounting interest
charges is not substantiated by the limited data which are available. 48
In fact, the authors of Delay in the Court reach a contrary conclusion,
asserting that the availability of interest to the personal injury claimant

will tend to increase the amount at which he will settle, even though the
defendant may at the same time offer somewhat more than he would

under the present rule.4 6 It therefore would seem that the defendant's
increased amenability to prompt settlement will be counter-balanced

by the plaintiff's resistance to offers not in accord with his greater expectations. If such be the case, no net gain will accrue to the tort calen-

dar. Accordingly, pre-judgment interest-without more factual data on
its bilateral impact-cannot be enthusiastically recommended on strictly
procedural grounds.47
Another proposal advanced in recent legislative sessions has recom-

mended revision of the offer to compromise procedure 48 to permit charging a party with interest and costs, or costs and attorney's fees, if he has

refused an offer which the outcome of the trial proves to have been reasonable. 49 It is the proposal invoking the sanction of attorney's fees

which we shall examine in some detail to assess its feasibility.
III. TMI OFFER TO COMPROMISE IN NEw YORK
The current text of the offer to compromise in New York reads:
Except in a matrimonial action, at any time not later than ten days before trial, any
party against whom a claim is asserted, and against whom a separate judgment may
be taken, may serve upon the claimant a written offer to allow judgment to be taken
against him for a sum or property or to the effect therein specified, with costs then
accrued. If within ten days thereafter the claimant serves a written notice that be
accepts the offer, either party may file the summons, complaint and offer, with proof
of acceptance, and thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment accordingly. If the offer
is not accepted and the claimant fails to obtain a more favorable judgment, be shall
not recover costs from the time of the offer, but shall pay costs from that time. An
offer of judgment shall not be made known to the jury.5°
45. See Zeisel, Kalven & Buchholz, supra note 6, at 129-30.
46. Id. at 131-33. Thus the settlement level may rise, but not the settlement ratio.
47. Id. at 140. See also McLaughlin, supra note 41, at 436.
48. N.Y. C.P..R. R. 3221 (MxKinney 1963).
49. See Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 Iowa L. Rev. 75
(1964); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Induded in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. Colo.
L. Rev. 202 (1966).
50. N.Y. C.P.LR. R. 3221 (MNcKinney 1963). See also N.Y. Uniform Dist. Ct. Act § 802
(McKinney 1963); N.Y.C. Civil Ct. Act § 802 (McKinney 1963).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 is substantially the same as N.Y. C.P.L.R. R. 3221 (McKinney 1963).
The controlling provision with reference to costs is: "If the judgment finally obtained by the
offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after
the making of the offer."
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Only the defending party may make an offer. 1 The offer must be in
writing, and the date of the offer fixes the time from which plaintiff may
be liable for costs. The inchoate liability for costs does not mature unless: (1) Plaintiff fails to serve a written notice of acceptance; (2)
within ten days after the defendant's offer; and (3) fails to obtain a
judgment more favorable than the defendant's offer. When these conditions are present, the plaintiff, even though he is the prevailing party, 2
is not entitled to costs "from the time of the offer, but shall pay costs
from that time." 3
If the purpose of the present rule and its predecessor is to encourage
plaintiffs to forego a trial where reasonable settlement is possible, 4 the
obvious question is: Does the imposition of a portion of the costs qualify
as a realistic inducement? For a case that involves more than a trivial
amount, the answer to this question must be that it does not. The basic
costs in an action, as provided by the CPLR, total one hundred and fifty
costs are awarded may, in addition, tax
dollars.5 5 The party to whom
"necessary disbursements,"5 6 and certain expenses incurred in prosecuting his claim. 57 Taken together, the risk of paying statutory costs

and of foregoing disbursements (if the latter is a corollary) has not impelled plaintiffs to accept offers of compromise. 8 The historical inefficacy of similar provisions in the Civil Practice Act invited an effort, by
those charged with drafting a new practice act for New York, to infuse
some vitality into the old procedure.
In the Tentative Draft appearing in the First Preliminary Report of
51. Since the terms of the statute are broad enough to cover any party against whom a
claim is asserted, there is no need to describe separately the procedure applicable to a
counterclaim. See Temp. Comm'n on the Courts, Rep. III, First Prelim. Rep. of the Advisory
Comm. on Prac. & Proc., 1957 N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 6(b), notes to Proposed Rule 31.11,
at 112 [hereinafter cited as Temp. Comm'n].
52. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 8101 (McKinney 1963); 8 J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, New
8101.21, 8102.01 (1965).
York Civil Practice 1111
53. N.Y. C.P.,.R. 3221 (McKinney 1963).
54. For comparison of the offer to compromise with the offer to liquidate damages and
with tender, see 4 J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, supra note 52, at g 3219.01.
55. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 8201 (McKinney 1963); N.Y.C. Civil Ct. Act § 1904 (McKinney
1963). But see graduated scale of costs in id. § 1901.
56. But see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 8301(c) (McKinney 1963): "The court may allow taxation
of disbursements by a party not awarded costs in an action ... "
57. Id. § 8301(a).
58. Anomalously, in the light of the undistinguished history of this settlement technique,
the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association recommended enactment of statutes
permitting defendant to make an offer of judgment and charging plaintiff with costs from
the time of the offer, should plaintiff fail to recover a judgment more favorable than the
offer. ABA Summary of Action, House of Delegates 5(C) (2) (Jan. 27-28, 1969).

1970]

PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION

the Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure,"9 the drafters revised the language of section 177 of the Civil Practice Act!, to permit
"any party against whom a claim is asserted" to serve a written offer.
More significantly, they introduced attorney's fees as a charge against
the claimant who unreasonably refused to accept an offer." No modification of this 1957 draft appeared in the Advisory Committee's Reports
of the succeeding three years." Rule 31.11 was incorporated in one of a
number of bills introduced in the 1960 legislature," and circulated for
59. Temp. Comm'n, supra note 51, Proposed Rule 31.11.
60. Ch. 925, § 177, [1920] Laws of N.Y. 79 (repealed 1962). "Defendant's offer to
compromise; proceedings thereon.
' efore the trial, the defendant may serve upon the plaintiff's attorney a written offer
to allow judgment to be taken against him for a sum, or property, or to the effect, therein
specified, with costs. If there be two or more defendants, and the action can be severed, a
like offer may be made by one or more defendants against whom a separate judgment may
be taken. If the plaintiff, within ten days thereafter, serve upon the defendant's attorney a
written notice that he accepts the offer, he may file the summons, complaint, and offer,
with proof of acceptance, and thereupon the clerk must enter judgment accordingly. If
notice of acceptance be not thus given, the offer cannot be given in evidence upon the trial;
but, if the plaintiff fail to obtain a more favorable judgment, he cannot recover costs from
the time of the offer, but must pay costs from that time."
61. The text of the proposed rule was: "31.11 Offer to compromise. At any time more
than ten days before trial, any party against whom a claim is asserted, and who may be
liable to a separate judgment, may serve upon the claimant a written offer to allow judgment to be taken against him for a sum or property or to the effect therein specified, with
costs then accrued. If within ten days thereafter the claimant serves a written notice that
he accepts the offer, either party may file the summons, complaint and offer, with proof
of acceptance, and thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment accordingly. If the offer is not
accepted and the claimant fails to obtain a more favorable judgment, he shall not recover
costs from the time of the offer, but shall pay costs, plus a reasonable attorney's fees fixed
by the court, for defending the action from that time. An offer of judgment shall not be
made known to the jury." Temp. Comm'n, supra note S1, at 112.
Similarly, in Proposed Rule 31.10, "Tender," the Advisory Committee incorporated an
allowance for attorney's fees in addition to costs, "[i]f it be determined upon the trial that
the tender ... was sufficient to have satisfied the obligation due under the contract ... .
Id. at 109. In Proposed Rule 31.12 "Offer to liquidate damages conditionally," if claimant
refuses the offer and the damages awarded do not exceed the offer, "be shall pay the
reasonable expenses incurred by his opponent in preparing for the trial of the question of
damages, including reasonable attorney's fees." Id. at 113.
62. See Temp. Comm'n on the Courts, Rep. IV, Fourth Prelim. Rep. of the Advisory
Comm. on Prac. & Proc., 1960 N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 20; Temp. Comm'n on the Courts,
Rep. III, Third Prelim. Rep. of the Advisory Comm. on Prac. & Proc., 1959 N.Y. Legis.
Doc. No. 17; Temp. Comm'n on the Courts, Rep. I, Second Prelim. Rep. of the Advisory
Comm. on Prac. & Proc., 1958 N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 13.
63. 1960 N.Y. Senate Print 27. Five bills were submitted to the legislature for study in
1960. See Fifth Prelim. Rep. by the Sen. Fin. Comm. and the Assembly Ways and Means
Comm., 1961 N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 15.
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study by bar associations and attorneys." Public hearings were conducted on the proposed legislation and many suggestions were received
from judges, attorneys and bar associations. The Codes Committees of
both Houses concluded, in 1961, that there was "sufficient disagreement
amongst the bar" to warrant certain changes in the bills. At the top of
the list was the instruction that "[s]anctions by assessment of attorneys
fees as costs should be omitted throughout.""5 Accordingly the Fifth
Preliminary Report, 66 dated 1961, reflected this mandate and incorporated, as Rule 3262,67 the offer to compromise shorn of any sanction but
the traditional costs.68 Rule 3221 in the CPLR follows the language of
proposed Rule 3262.
IV. PROPOSED REVISION
Although the offer to compromise reverted to its traditional form in
the CPLR, the earlier recommendation of the Advisory CommitteeRule 31.11 6 -generated interest and discussion. As previously noted,
this Rule permitted "any party against whom a claim is asserted" to
serve a written offer upon the claimant. Failure to accept the offer, followed by failure to achieve a better recovery after trial, would result
in the claimant being deprived of costs and charged with reasonable attorney's fees from the time of the offer. Using Rule 31.11 as a springboard, Justice Abraham N. Geller wrote a series of provocative articles"0
critical of the established and suggested procedure, and recommended
the following text:
Offer to compromise. At any time not later than thirty days before trial any party to
an action based upon tort may serve upon any other party a written offer to accept,

if he be the plaintiff, or to allow, if he be the defendant, a judgment to be entered
against defendant for a sum or property or to the effect therein specified, with costs

then accrued. At any time not later than ten days before trial the party served with
such an offer may serve a written counter-offer to accept or allow, as the case may
be, judgment to be entered for a sum or property or to the effect therein specified,
with costs then accrued. If, within twenty days after service of an offer, or within
64.
65.

Fifth Prelim. Rep., supra note 63, at 7.
Id. at 12.

66. See Fifth Prelim. Rep., supra note 63.
67. Id. at 507-08.
68. The notes following Rule 3262 point out that: "Attorneys' fees are not a part of these
costs so that the rule provides far less inducement to offer a compromise than It did In the
1960 draft." Id. at 508.
69. See Temp. Comm'n, supra note 51, Proposed Rule 31.11.
70. Geller & Spindel, Unreasonable Refusal to Settle and Calendar Congestion-Suggested
Remedy (pts. 1-4), 146 N.Y.LJ. Oct. 9-11, Nov. 22, 1961, in ABA Section of Int'l & Comparative Law, Part IV, Comm. Reps. of Comparative Law Div. at 134-42 (1962); Geller,
Unreasonable Refusal to Settle and Calendar Congestion-Suggested Remedy, 34 N.Y. St.

BJ. 477 (1962).
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five days after service of a counter-offer, the party served with an offer or counteroffer serves a written notice that he accepts same, either party may file the summons, complaint and offer or counter-offer, with proof of acceptance, and thereupon
the clerk shall enter judgment accordingly. If no offers or counter-offers are accepted
and the case proceeds to trial, the following shall apply: If plaintiff obtains judgment
for at least the sum specified in his last offer or counter-offer, he shall recover costs,
plus reasonable attorney's fees fixed by the court, for prosecuting the action from that
time. If plaintiff fails to obtain judgment in excess of the sum specified in defendant's
last offer or counter-offer, plaintiff shall not recover costs from the time of defendant's
last offer or counter-offer, but shall pay costs, plus7 reasonable attorney's fees fixed
by the court, for defending the action from that time. '

Immediately apparent innovations in Justice Geller's proposal are its
limitation to tort actions,7 2 its availability to plaintiffs as well as defendants,rs and the facilitation of bilateral initiatives by permitting an
exchange of offers and counter-offers.74 The plaintiff thus would have

the opportunity to revise his original demand, which may have been inflated, while the defendant would be able to respond to a change in his
adversary's position.
There are situations in which the rule would not be effective. Thus,

for example, where neither side wished to engage in bargaining and
where the judgment was for a sum less than plaintiff's offer but more
than defendant's offer, neither party would be awarded attorney's fees.
Furthermore, the author suggested that the defendant be awarded attorney's fees only if the plaintiff prevailed, i.e., the fees would be a reduction of plaintiff's verdict.75
The principle stated in the Geller revision, that the court shall fix the

fees, is intended to permit the exercise of discretion.70 Thus the court
71. See Geller & Spindel, supra note 70, pt. 1, at 4, col 4-5.
72. justice Geller confined his suggested procedure more specifically to personal injury
cases for the reason that "Et]here is no pressing calendar problem associated with contract
and equity cases ...

."

Geller, supra note 70, at 478.

73. The procedure in N.Y. C.P.A. § 177 [Ch. 925, § 177, [1920] Laws of N.Y. 79
(repealed 1962)] permitted only a defendant to make an offer. Under Proposed Rule 31.11
and N.Y. C.P.L.R. R. 3221 (McKinney 1963), an offer can be made only by the party against
whom a claim is asserted. Thus only the claimant would be subjected to whatever coercive
force the rule possessed.
74. Certain details of the suggested text-such as the time sequence of interchange of
offers, the incorporation of attorney's fees in the recovery for purposes of determining the
contingent fee, etc.-could be modified without striking at the substance of the revised
procedure.
75. The author puts the case of a seriously injured plaintiff facing a defendant whose
liability is doubtful. The defendant makes a nominal offer; the plaintiff refuses and loses
on the liability issue. Imposition of attorney's fees might work a severe hardship upon such
a plaintiff. Geller, supra note 70, at 479. See Geller & Spindel, supra note 70, pt. 3, at 4,
col. 2.
76. Cf. N.Y. C.PJ..R. § 8101 (McKinney 1963).
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under all the circumstances, it
could refuse to allow attorney's fees if,
77
would be inequitable to award them.
At the heart of Justice Geller's suggestions is the desire to preserve
the court's role in personal injury adjudication and to avoid the transfer
of such claims to an agency or administrative bureau."' The proposal
is logical but generates certain problems. It is logical in the sense that it
applies leverage at the critical pretrial point. It might accelerate the
compromise of claims which would otherwise be settled during trial. As
a practical matter, however, judges might find the task of fixing fees,
and decisions on when not to award them, troublesome. Furthermore,
the most pronounced effect of the rule would be upon attorneys, who
probably would consider the imposition of attorney's fees as costs a
measure of coercion. Apart from a natural reluctance to change, some
lawyers might look upon the proposed rule as a threat to their freedom
to accept cases which they now are willing to undertake, or to conduct
the prosecution of a claim or of a defense in accordance with their established pattern of practice.
The contingent fee is an issue in any rule affecting the source and
amount of payment to attorneys in negligence cases.70 Attorneys in the
United States, unlike their English brethren, have not been nurtured on
the concept of fees as a part of costs.80 While contingent fees are subject
at least to the general supervision of the courts and the self-discipline of
the profession,8 ' lawyers might adopt the view that the proposed modifi77. See Geller & Spindel, supra note 70, pt. 4, at 4, col. 2. Further to strengthen the
compromise procedure, Justice Geller recommended revisions in the Insurance Law (N.Y.
Ins. Law § 167(1) (b) (McKinney 1966)), to induce insurers "to settle serious and deserving cases by offering or contributing their policy limits . . . . " Geller & Spindel, supra
note 70, pt. 2, at 4, col. 1. If the plaintiff served an offer or counter-offer for a sum within
the applicable limit of coverage or for a sum in excess of the policy limits and It was
rejected because the insurer refused to contribute the policy limits, the plaintiff, upon
obtaining a judgment equaling or exceeding his offer, would become entitled to fees and
costs from the time of the offer, "even though such costs and fees may constitute sums In
excess of the policy limits." Id. On the consequences of "bad faith" on the part of the
insurer, where a recovery in excess of policy limits is a possibility, see Brockstein v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1969); Young v. American Cas. Co., 416 F.2d 906
(2d Cir. 1969), petition for cert. dismissed, 396 U.S. 997 (1970).
78. See Geller & Spindel, supra note 70, pt. 1, at 4, col. 1.
79. Examination of justifications for and criticisms of the contingent fee in American
practice is not a part of this study. See Radin, Contingent Fees in California, 28 Calif. L.
Rev. 587 (1940).
80. Id. at 595. See also R. Jackson, The Machinery of Justice in England 325-30 (8th
ed. 1967).
81. See ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 2, Ethical Considerations 13-20
(1969); N.Y. Court Rules, App. Div. First Dep't § 603.4(e)(1), (2), (5) & App. Dlv.
Second Dep't § 691.4(e)(1), (2), (5) (McKinney 1970). See also Q. Johnstone & D. Hopson, Lawyers and Their Work 59-64 (1967).
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cation of Rule 3221 would unduly interfere with the economic arrangements they have customarily entered into with clients in personal injury
cases."' If the bar concluded that the new procedure placed its members
in a more precarious position vis-a-vis clients and the expectation of
remuneration,a its representatives in the state legislature could be expected to act unfavorably upon the proposed revision. Under the shadow
of sanctions, lawyers might refuse the cases of impecunious claimants,
and claimants apprised of the risk of a recovery diminished by attorney's fees might forego legal action. If only meretricious claims were
discouraged by the rule's operation, the public and judicial administration would benefit. Such preferential discrimination, however, can hardly
be expected.
How would the proposed rule affect the number of hard core cases
which reach trial? In their article Delay and the Dynamics of Personal
Injury Litigation,' Professors Rosenberg and Sovern focused attention
upon identifying claims which resist settlement and become consumers
of court time due to their potential for high recovery. s0 In such cases,
the adversaries are willing to face the expense of a trial.
It is not hard to understand why the large potential value of a suit should predispose it to reach trial. The explanation lies in basic economic considerations. If a
plaintiff is serious in his estimate that his case is worth about $50,000 and the defendant is equally convinced that it is worth no more than about $20,000, neither is
likely to give up $30,000, or even $15,000, to avoid the expense of a trial. There is
enough at stake to make the expense worthwhile. But this plainly is not true if the
plaintiff's figure is $1,000 and the defendant's $300 .... 8T

It is questionable whether the added risk of attorney's fees as a cost
would alter the economic and psychological factors in such cases to the
point of dictating pretrial settlements. Rather, it is possible that this
situation would produce the same result that might occur if prejudgment
interest were imposed in personal injury actions: 8 parties would adjust
their demand and offer levels to accommodate the new risk. Thus the
bargaining might be conducted on a higher monetary plane, without
82. For a contrasting view of fees as costs, see comments pertaining to the practice in
continental legal systems in ABA Section of Int'l & Comparative Law, supra note 70, at
117-34 (1962).
83. For the problems and pressures experienced by practitioners, see generally J. Carlin,
Lawyers' Ethics (1966); J. Carlin, Lawyers on Their Own (1962).
84. See R. Jackson, supra note 80, at 330-31.
85. Rosenberg & Sovern, Delay and the Dynamics of Personal Injury Litigation, 59
Colum. L. Rev. 1115 (1959).
86. Id. at 1137-39. Based on data from the first department, the authors found that
one out of twenty suits recovering $3,000 or less reached trial, whereas one out of five suits
recovering more than $3,000 reached trial.
87. Id. at 1136 (footnote omitted).
88. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
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bridging the gap between the positions of the parties. Justice Geller's
suggestion that attorney's fees be assessed against a plaintiff only if he
recovered, so that the fees could be subtracted from his award, clearly
leaves the defendant with more to fear from this proposal than the
plaintiff.
Let it also be recalled that the wording of the suggested rule89 makes
the initiation of the offer procedure a voluntary matter. Any party may
serve an offer. Could we anticipate that there might arise a fraternal
boycott of the entire procedure by negligence lawyers, analogous to the
conspiracy of silence attributed to the medical profession? If the mechanism of offers and counter-offers is never initiated, who can be called
to task for recalcitrance or unreasonableness? That a tacit understanding, manifesting itself in forbearance, might vitiate the proposed inducement to settle is not an idle supposition. The lawyer, expecting to
face his current adversary on future occasions in court, might well be
tempted to adhere to the golden rule.
It appears, therefore, that the probable reaction of the legal profession to the stern inducement of attorney's fees can be predicted. The
proposed rule's effect upon prospective claimants and upon the size and
number of cases which will resist its influence will also largely depend on
the attitude of lawyers. Without polling the profession-a formidable
undertaking not within the scope of this study-that attitude cannot be
statistically defined. There are, however, some aspects of the offer to
compromise problem which do lend themselves to a more modest scale
of investigation.
Initially, the parochial view can be at least temporarily relinquished,
and the procedure examined in a more general context.
Secondly, it is possible to advance beyond the present and proposed
forms of the procedure to test reaction to a mandatory rule which would
eliminate some of the infirmities of the voluntary systems.
Thirdly, questions may be directed to a random sample of judges to
obtain the reaction of the judiciary to a new form of the offer to compromise.

V.

THE OFFER TO COMPROMISE IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

The offer to compromise under the New York Civil Practice Act, sections 177 and 178, languished in desuetude. There is no evidence that
its restatement as Rule 3221 in the Civil Practice Law and Rules has
achieved a more prominent role than its progenitor in fostering pretrial
settlement. Is there some quality indigenous to New York practice which
has perpetuated the lifeless state of this procedure? What has been the
89.

See text accompanying note 71 supra.
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experience in other states with rules similar to CPLR 3221 or Federal
Rule 68? If the results parallel those in New York, do other jurisdictions
contemplate any revision of their procedures?
To answer these questions, the writer initiated correspondence with
the chief justices of twenty-eight states90 having an offer to compromise
or offer of judgment provision which imposes costs upon the party who
has refused a reasonable offer. 91 Replies were received from 18 states. 2
In two instances, the respondent could not supply any of the requested
information, while in other instances only part of the requested information was received.93 The questions and answers are set forth below. For
purposes of categorizing the answers received, the questions posed can
be summarized as follows:
1. Do attorneys in personal injury litigation in your state invoke this
procedureP4 to encourage settlements before trial?
2. If so, would you estimate the frequency with which the offer to compromise is utilized? (E.g., rarely, substantial number of cases, very frequently, etc.)
3. Has there been any sentiment in the judiciary or the legislature to
change the voluntary nature of the offer to compromise by requiring
defendant to tender an offer or plaintiff a demand (with opportunity for
a counter-offer by defendant) close to the trial date?
4. Do you think that a mandatory provision of this kind is feasible in
your jurisdiction?
5. Has there been any sentiment in the judiciary or the legislature to
augment the sanction of costs (chargeable to the party unreasonably refusing his adversary's offer) by imposing upon such refusing party the
reasonable attorney's fees of his opponent?
6. Do you believe that such a penalty provision is:
(a) workable from the viewpoint of judicial administration;
(b) acceptable to the bench and bar; and
(c) a fair method of applying pressure on litigants to settle?
90. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Jerey,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
91. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
92. Replies were received from Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Idaho, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico,
Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
93. In other instances, the responses were incomplete. However, all the classifiable information that was supplied is included in the text, with the exception of the "don't know"
answers.

94. The reference relates to the first paragraph of the letter, which discussed offer to
compromise provisions.
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The following table reflects the answers which were received:
TABLE A
Responses from Other States
Question

Yes

No

1
2
3
4
5

12

3

1
1
1

14
6
11

6

S

6 (a)

Other
11*

(b)
5
(c)
3
7
* The response, in all 11 cases, was "rarely."
** 3 replies stated that such a provision would be unacceptable to the bar; 2 stated that
it would be acceptable to the bench.

Summarizing these responses, it appears that the offer to compromise,
when utilized at all in other jurisdictions, is only rarely invoked. In some
states, "rarely" means "practically never" or "in only a few cases." In
no state responding is the procedure employed in a substantial number
of cases or very frequently.
The overwhelming sentiment is against making the offer mandatory.
This is supplemented by the opinion that it would not be deemed feasible
to require offers by the parties."" Similarly, there is no reported inclination on the part of the judges or legislators in other states to impose attorney's fees as an inducement to settle. 7 The respondents were split
on the question of the utility-in the abstract-of attorney's fees as
leverage. But on the realistic proposition of whether or not such a
change would be acceptable to the bench and bar, five found it unacceptable to both groups and an additional three concluded that the bar
would oppose assessing fees." A majority of those answering question
6(c) believed that imposition of fees would be an unfair method of
pressuring litigants to settle.
95. One respondent from the west stated his belief that the attorneys in his state are
generally opposed to the exertion of any pressures, judicial or otherwise, seeking to accomplish out-of-court settlements of personal injury cases rather than trying them.
Although most of the states in the sample had no court congestion problem comparable
to that in the metropolitan New York area, those which could be expected to experience
court delay concurred in the lack of sentiment to make the offer to compromise mandatory.
96. See answers to questions 3 and 4.
97. See answers to question 5.
98. See answers to question 6(b).
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It may be concluded, therefore, that other jurisdictions have matched
New York's experience with the offer to compromise. The procedure is
ignored by the bar and consequently plays no demonstrable role in
avoiding personal injury litigation. At the same time, there is no general
enthusiasm discernible in other states to re-shape the procedure by introducing sanctions of more import than costs, or by requiring the parties to exchange offers before trial.
VI.

SoMM OPINIONS OF NEW YoRK JUDGES

In the interest of acquiring additional data, the writer sought the reaction of members of the New York judiciary to revision of the offer to
compromise. A questionnaire was prepared for distribution at the New
York State Trial Judges Conference in June 1969. The number of
judges receiving the questionnaire is not known. In addition, sixtyseven names were selected at random from the list of Supreme Court
Justices and New York City Civil Court Judges. The response was so
minimal 9 that it cannot be given statistical weight. The results are,
however, interesting and are reported below. The following questions
were asked:
1. Should Rule 3221 require that defendant submit an offer to compromise?
2. If so, should plaintiff be required to make a counteroffer?
3. Should plaintiff be permitted or required to make a demand close to
the trial date specifying the amount for which he would settle? (Presumably this demand will be lower than the amount specified in the complaint)
4. If so, should defendant be required to make a counteroffer?
5. If plaintiff rejects defendant's offer to compromise and plaintiff fails
to obtain judgment in excess of defendant's offer, should defendant recover costs and reasonable attorney's fees: (a) from the time the offer
is made; (b) from the time the offer is rejected; or (c) for the action
as a whole?
6. Similarly, if defendant rejects plaintiff's demand and plaintiff obtains
judgment in excess of his demand, should plaintiff recover costs and reasonable attorney's fees: (a) from the time the demand is made; (b)
from the time the demand is rejected; or (c) for the action as a whole?
7. Should costs and attorney's fees allowed to a defendant be awarded
only in reduction of plaintiff's verdict?
8. Should the statute specifically provide that the trial court has discretion
99. Seventeen completed questionnaires were returned.
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to deny the award of costs and attorney's fees where such award would
be inequitable?
9. If the sanction of attorney's fees is imposed for defendant's unreasonable refusal of plaintiff's demand, should the insurer be obligated to pay
costs and attorney's fees over and above the payment to the plaintiff of
the policy limits?
The answers which were received to the preceding questions are reflected
in the following table:
TABLE B
Responses from New York Judges
Question

Yes

No

Other

1
2
3
4
5 (a)
(b)

8
8
6
10
4
4

8
3
5
3

6*
3*

(c)
6 (a)

3
4

(b)

3

(c)

4

7
8
9
*
**

8
10
12

it
51.t

it
5"f"
5
1
2

1
2t

Permitted-2; required-4.

No answer because the answer to question 3 was "No."
t Should recover costs but not attorney's fees.
tt None of these.

The questionnaire concluded with the request that the respondent "note
any procedural changes you think would be effective in reducing delays
in personal injury litigation." One judge who had carefully answered all
the nine questions wrote: "Aren't these enough?" Other comments contained the following suggestions:
1. Amend Rule 4011 to make initial trial of the liability issue mandatory.
2. The medical exchange rule should provide mandatory preclusion for
failure to comply.
3. The sanction of attorney's fees should be invoked only where the
award-is 25 per cent more or less than the last offer rejected.
4. Cases under $10,000 should be tried by a panel of one judge and two
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laymen. Rules of evidence should be relaxed. Written reports of doctors
should be used instead of personal testimony.
5. Interest should be imposed from the date of the accident to the date
of judgment.
6. Filing fees should be scaled to the amount of the demand.
As noted previously, it would be idle to draw conclusions from seventeen
completed questionnaires. A number of reasons could be offered for the
paucity of response,'0° but the reason for putting the questions to the
judges is clear. They are the instrumentality through which a rule becomes functional. Their lack of faith in the efficacy or justice of a rule is
likely to influence the incidence of its use. As an illustration, summary
judgment,' available in any action, is seldom granted in personal injury
actions.0 2 A mandatory offer to compromise rule, if enacted, could not
and would not be disregarded by the bench. Nevertheless, if the rule
permitted exercise of discretion in applying the sanction of attorney's
fees, 03 then as one judge responding to the questionnaire commented,
discretion "would probably be exercised to such an extent that the rule
would become ineffective." The anticipated attitude of judges must be
given serious consideration in projecting procedural changes.
Had a much larger number of judges answered the questionnaire and
had the distribution of responses approximated those noted above, we
could have made the guarded observation'0 4 that judges would favor
strengthening the offer to compromise. Such affirmative support would be
in direct contrast to the negative reaction anticipated from the negligence
bar. As matters stand, however, one can detect no positive forces at work
which would commend the proposed revision of the rule to the practicing
profession, hold out any promise of its efficacy as a voluntary procedure,
or indicate the feasibility of its adoption.
In sum, a voluntary offer to compromise rule incorporating the sanction
of attorney's fees as an inducement to pretrial settlement is not, under
present circumstances, the answer to court delay. A mandatory rule could
100. The pressures of time and/or reluctance to submit to another in the stream of endless polls may explain the lack of response. More importantly, however, judges may have

thought the offer to compromise of so little significance that it was not worth the effort
to reconstruct it. It is possible that those judges who do favor more vigorous settlement
inducements were more inclined to respond.
101.

See N.Y. C.P.L.R. R. 3212 (McKinney 1963).

102. See Forkosch, Summary Judgment in Automobile Negligence Cases: A Procedural
Analysis and Suggestions, 53 Cornell L. Rev. 814, 815-17 (1968).
103. See question 8 and answers in text following note 99 supra.
104. The basis for this observation would be the answers to questions 3, 4, 5, & 6.
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be effective, but would have even less chance of surviving a legislative
veto. The choice appears to be twofold: (a) To continue applying all
the procedural techniques now employed in the hope that eventually they
will erode the backlog; or (b) to transfer personal injury actions out of
the courts to a substitute forum.
The latter choice necessitates a difficult and unpopular decision.105
Nevertheless, the decision may be inescapable if the crisis in criminal
justice continues and if more civil cases are not disposed of without timeconsuming jury trials. If the necessary resources of judicial administration
are to be devoted to clearing the backlog of criminal cases, consideration
must be given to more economical and different methods of adjudicating
the accident cases which dominate the civil calendar.
VII.

COMrULsoRY

AND VOLUNTARY

ARBITRATION:

COURT PANELS

arbitration.1 00

In its compulsory
The most obvious substitution-forum is
form, arbitration is widely used in certain categories of accident claims.
Reference has been made to the Pennsylvania system of compulsory arbitration for civil cases under three thousand dollars.10 7 While successful
in reducing the backlog of the Philadelphia Municipal Court,1 08 the plan
is subject to certain limitations: it is confined to small claims; it absorbs
large quantities of attorneys' time as arbitrators; plaintiffs' lawyers are
allegedly overrepresented on the panels; and arbitrators decisions are
reversed in about one-third of the appealed tort cases reaching verdict. 00
It is doubtful that this system could be transposed to a court of general
jurisdiction where high potential recovery cases persist to trial.
Another example of arbitration operating in the accident field is the
system maintained by insurance companies for disputes relating to physical damage claims. The Nationwide Inter-Company Arbitration Agreement provides for a network of local arbitration committees appointed
by the Committee on Insurance Arbitration 1 from among representatives
105. If it would be difficult to aggregate, from lawyers within and without the legislature, the support necessary for amending Rule 3221, one can easily prophesy the reception
which would greet a change of forum proposal. On the other hand, in a crisis situation,
public opinion may build to a point where sweeping reform is more popular and plausible
than manipulations of obscure details.
106. See Coulson, The Broadening Use of Arbitration, in Lampert, Coulson, Falls &
Conway, Arbitration Procedure and Practice, 24 N.Y. County Lawyer's Ass'n B. Bull. 14,
15 (1966-67).
107. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
108. See Rosenberg & Schubin, supra note 7, at 462-63.
109. Id. at 464-66; Reparations Rep., supra note 4, at 57-59.
110. The Committee on Insurance Arbitration represents the American Insurance Asso-
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of signatory insurance companies. Signatories of the Nationwide Agreement are bound to forego litigation of any disputes involving automobile
physical damage subrogation claims not in excess of $2,500."' The hearings before the local committees are informal,1 2 and their decisions are
final and binding upon the parties." 3
As of July 1, 1969, there were 472 insurance companies subscribing
to the Agreement.114 In 1968, 97,093 cases were brought before 119 arbitration committees. 115 Almost 100,000 cases were closed in 1968,""
representing claims in excess of $31,000,000.117
The Special Arbitration Agreement, also sponsored by the large insurance associations, applies to bodily injury as well as property damage
claims. The signatories"" bind themselves to arbitrate disputes where each
has issued liability coverage to one or more parties, or where each has
issued separate liability insurance to the same party against whom a
claim arises and where the overall settlement value does not exceed ten
thousand dollars. By this procedure, the insurers bind themselves to the
apportionment of damages determined by the arbitration committee.
Taken together, these compulsory, inter-company arbitration arrangements relieve the courts of many small claims." 0
Another area in which arbitration plays a prominent role concerns the
determination of certain issues under the Uninsured Motorist Endorseciation, American Mutual Insurance Alliance, and the National Association of Independent
Insurers. For comment on these organizations see King, The Insurance Industry and Conpensation Plans, 43 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1137, 1140 (1968).
111. Signatories may agree to submit higher claims or other controversies to the committees.
112. See Demer, Inter-Company Arbitration Revisited, 52 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 111 (1968).
113. It should be noted that the Philadelphia plan and the compulsory arbitration system
enacted in New York in 1970 (see text accompanying notes 7-15 supra) provide for appmls
in the form of a trial de novo.
114. Comm. on Insurance Arbitration, Arbitration Newsletter, Vol. 1, No. 4, at I,col. 2
(July 1969).
115. Id., No. 3, at 1, col. 1 (April 1969).
116. Id.
117. Letter from Charles F. Berryman, Director, Casualty Claims, American Mutual Insurance Alliance, July 24, 1969.
118. As of February 1969, approximately 200 insurance companies were parties to the
agreement.
119. "The tremendous public service that is rendered by those who conceived and
operate this agreement without burden to the taxpayers is not less valuable because it is so
little known. It is probably the largest arbitration system in the world." Reparations Rep,
supra note 4, at 52 (footnote omitted).
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ment attached to the basic automobile liability policy. If the insured1 20
and the insurer do not agree that the insured is "legally entitled to recover
damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured highway vehicle, or
do not agree as to the amount of payment which may be owing," the
matter shall be submitted to arbitration. 121 By a narrow reading of this
clause, the scope of arbitration is limited to the two issues of fault and
damages. Thus, arbitration will be stayed while the parties revert to the
courts to settle a vexatious number of questions dealing with coverage,
disclaimers, notice and other details. 22 Unlike the Pennsylvania plan,
which permits appeal (actually a trial de novo before a jury), arbitration
under the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement results in a final decision.
A comparison of these two major compulsory systems reveals interesting differences but does not point to the conclusion that either can provide
a satisfactory substitute for court adjudication. Inter-company arbitration
functions in an industry setting and is primarily devoted to physical
damage claims. One can assume that it is efficient, economical and apparently fair enough to satisfy the participants. It deals with relatively
simple problems such as the apportioning or exchanging of payments,
where liability and the overall settlement figure have been pre-decided.
By contrast, these very issues of fault and compensation are the only
matters with which Uninsured Motorist arbitration may concern itself.
Furthermore, the system deals solely with personal injury claims, an area
inherently more complex than bent fenders and crushed bumpers. While
its fairness cannot intelligently be challenged in the absence of data
measuring the quality of the proceedings, some observations on efficiency
and economy can be ventured. As the system now operates, it cannot
achieve maximal efficiency. 2 Even though arbitrators dispose of their
cases with dispatch, their consideration of a case is often interrupted by
necessary recourse to the courts to resolve some non-arbitrable question.
The total time spent in arbitration and before the courts may not show
a net gain in efficiency. For the same reason, those cases which commence in arbitration and are then deflected to the courts may result in
120. The "insured" is specifically defined by the statute. See N.Y. Ins. Law § 601(1)
(McKinney 1966).
121. See 1966 Standard Form, Part VI: Additional Conditions: F. Arbitration. See
also Widiss, Perspectives on Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 62 Nw. U.L. Rev. 497, 538-42 &
n.148 (1967).
122. See Laufer, Insurance Against Lack of Insurance? A Dissent from the 'Uninsured
Motorist Endorsement, 1969 Duke L.J. 227, 240-42.

123.

But see the favorable commentary of Aksen, Arbitration of Automobile Accident

Cases, 1 Conn. L. Rev. 70 (1968).
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little or no economy in total cost over the dispute that proceeds solely
through normal court channels. In justice, it must be noted that such
shortcomings cannot be laid to arbitration as a system, but rather stem
from the limited charge given by the statute to the arbitrators and from
the courts' interpretation of the statute." 4 If the decision is reached that
accident claims must be removed from the courts and transferred to an
arbitral forum, the legislature should eliminate the confusion and constraints which now characterize arbitration of claims against uninsured
motorists.
In the field of voluntary arbitration, one can find no evidence to support
it as an auspicious alternative. In a recent report, the American Bar Association's Committee on Automobile Accident Reparations recommended
that "efforts to bring about a fair and workable plan for the voluntary
arbitration of appropriate categories of small tort claims arising from
automobile accidents be continued," but also observed that "purely voluntary arbitration of ordinary automobile claims has neither been popular
nor successful in disposing of large numbers of cases."'"
A voluntary arbitration plan, administered by the American Arbitration Association, was implemented in Erie County in 1968. It is limited
to personal injury claims not exceeding five thousand dollars. The basic
fees per case are two hundred and fifty dollars and there is no right of
appeal."2 Relatively few cases have been submitted for arbitration under
the plan. The very fact that it is voluntary and somewhat expensive may
account for the plan's unenthusiastic reception in Erie County.
All of the arbitration plans discussed above involve relatively small
monetary amounts. As Professor Rosenberg pointed out: "[There] is a
prevailing attitude that, whatever its procedural advantages, arbitration
is not an acceptable substitute for the court process where large sums of
money are at stake .... If lawyers are convinced that large cases deserve
courtroom trials they can be counted on to appeal arbitrators' awards in
such cases."' 127 Consequently, unless drastic limitations on appeals were
enforced, large cases would resist final disposition by arbitration and
their contribution to calendar congestion would not be diminished. But
gains could be realized for suits below a pivotal figure, for example five
or ten thousand dollars, provided the system was compulsory.
Another alternative was proposed by Justice Samuel H. Hofstadter
124.

See generally Widiss, supra note 121, at 538-42.

125.
126.

See Reparations Rep., supra note 4, at 60.
See Proposal for Voluntary Arbitration, Erie County, New York, May 13, 1969.

127.

Rosenberg & Schubin, supra note 7, at 468.
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more than a decade ago. 2 8 Since enactment of a compensation plan (his
first suggestion) did not appear to be practicable, Justice Hofstadter
suggested that automobile accident cases be tried before special courts
composed of three members: a judge, a physician and a layman.12 He
characterized the procedure as midway between the traditional trial by
jury and trial by court.
The advantages which Justice Hofstadter attributed to the tripartite
court were both general and specific. The backlog of personal injury suits
could be reduced, and the expense of full jury trials in automobile accident
cases could be eliminated. The panel would represent a combination of
talents and virtues: "The jurist will provide legal learning and experience;
limiting the number to one will conserve judicial manpower. The leavening impact of lay thinking will be provided by the nonprofessional member. And the physician will provide ... impartial medical guidance-not
advocacy .
,,.-o The parties to the controversy would find assurance in
the representativeness of the panel and in the collective judgment they
would render. And for counsel, the special court procedure would have
the appeal of maintaining the adversary system.
Justice Hofstadter's proposal merits fresh consideration, although difficulties must be noted. It would necessitate a constitutional amendment,
and would encounter the opposition which is generic to any plan contemplating the elimination or curtailment of trial by jury.lal Attracting the
necessary number of medical panelists might also prove to be very difficult.
Nevertheless, if the necessity of revising and improving the method of
personal injury adjudication is accepted, and particularly if the legal
profession becomes reconciled to that necessity, it might find the Hofstadter plan a more attractive alternative than an administrative board, or
arbitration for all negligence claims. Negligence cases would remain in
the courts, and the roles of the judge and the advocate would be intrinsically preserved. As a starting point for serious examination of compromise solutions, the panel-court idea offers possibilities which should
not be ignored.
128. Hofstadter, Alternative Proposal to the Compensation Plan (pts. 1-3), 135 N.Y.L.J.,
March 13-15, 1956, at 4, col. 1.
129. Id. pt. 1, at 4, co]. 2.
130. Hofstadter, supra note 2, at 60. That part of Justice Hofstadter's proposal which
advocates substituting comparative negligence for contributory negligence is omitted, not
because it lacks importance but because it is a substantive matter not included within
the scope of this study.
131. See Hofstadter, supra note 128, pt. 3, at 4, col. 2.
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VIII. CONCLUDING CONSIDERATIONS

After a quarter of a century of struggle to reduce the tort jury calendar
to manageable proportions, it is time to lay aside individual preferences,
the security of established patterns, and the insistence upon trial by jury.
The facile initiation of lawsuits as arch bargaining weapons for those who
suffer personal injury or property damage as a result of a traffic accident
must be abandoned. Severe restrictions upon the right of claimants to
commence negligence actions are, of course, inadvisable. A citizen's access
to the courts or to a substitute forum supported by the state ought not to
be curtailed, even though some complaints can be summarily dismissed as
devoid of good faith or substance. Apart from these sham claims, there
remains the large number of lawsuits in which the plaintiff and his attorney honestly believe there is a good cause of action. If even a relatively
small percentage of these persist to trial or to the eve of trial, and in the
meantime are adjourned and recalendared, the backlog of civil cases in
the metropolitan courts will continue. Court delay in the densely populated areas of New York continues, even though only about three percent of civil cases are actually tried.
The solution may be reached through an increase in the number of pretrial settlements, or alteration of the trial format or forum, or through a
combination of these two measures. As to the first method, it is apparent
that section 3221 of the CPLR has been an inefficacious tool for encouraging conciliation of the parties at an early stage of the controversy. Court
costs do not represent a realistic inducement. Under the present rule,
only the claimant may be penalized for refusing an offer to compromise.
The revision proposed by Justice Geller possesses the advantages of
permitting offers by both sides, and providing a forceful sanction-imposition of attorney's fees-for rejection of a reasonable offer. Parties
may, however, be willing to assume the risk where the monetary stakes
are very high. So long as the offer to compromise remains permissive,
lawyers may continue to avoid its use.
When the CPLR was drafted, there was no enthusiasm in the legislature for assessing attorney's fees as costs. There is no evidence that a
favorable reception would greet such a proposal today. A mandatory
offer and counteroffer procedure, buttressed by attorney's fees, would
produce a potent inducement to settle. Nevertheless, if the legislature
and the profession are hostile to assessing attorney's fees as a voluntarily
initiated measure, they would scarcely support it as the end result of a
compulsory procedure.
Rather, if pretrial settlement is to continue as the major technique to
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combat delay, courts must find means of utilizing pretrial conferences
more effectively. The conference and assignment system introduced in
the Civil Court of the City of New York early in 1970132 has produced
dramatic results in that court. It presents the parties and their counsel
with the alternative of immediate trial if differences cannot be adjusted
in conference. Where judicial manpower is available and where the
character of the cases before a court lends itself to conciliation and compromise, judges might consider implementation of some form of the conference and assignment system upon a trial basis to determine its effect
upon the civil calendar of their jurisdiction.
If the second method-altering the trial format or forum-is pursued,
several possibilities arise. A liminal concession is necessary, i.e., that this
approach will not produce the desired results unless the role of the jury
is eliminated. Juries are time consuming. Not only the formal impaneling
of a jury, but also the process of notification, preliminary determination
of eligibility, maintaining a pool available for trial, emphasis upon the
rules of evidence at trial, charging the jury-all make substantial demands
upon court personnel and jurors. Juries are expensive. While the recently
increased per diem fee of jurors is still a modest day's pay, the aggregate
of such fees in a large metropolitan area may mount to millions of dollars.
There is also a substantial cost incurred by business enterprises whose
employees are absent on jury duty. Finally, there is the physical as well
as financial problem of providing facilities for jurors at the courthouses.
One might argue that if jurors are indeed superior to judges as triers
of fact, then the burdens of extra delay and costs must be borne in the
interest of achieving better justice. Of course, there is no consensus that
jurors possess more sagacity, objectivity and fairmindedness than judges.
Even if there were a public conviction on this point, however, it would
not eliminate the necessity for some compromise with the ideal tribunal
based upon the present exigencies of the criminal and civil calendars. The
practical goal is to select the best possible forum and procedure for adjudication under existing circumstances.
Arbitration by a panel of lawyer-arbitrators is one alternative. New
York already has instituted a pilot program to evaluate compulsory arbitration for controversies not exceeding three thousand dollars. Nevertheless, several questions arise. If the plan is successful in one area or
court, can a valid projection of its effect upon a complex metropolitan
area such as New York City be extrapolated from the data which will
be available? To what extent will lawyers be able or willing to offer their
services for a modest remuneration as arbitrators? What will be the rate
132.

See p. 229 supra.
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of appeal? Unless it is minimal (for example, four or five per cent), cases

reverting to the courts for a new trial with a jury may dissipate initial
savings of time and expense.
Is the cut-off point too low? While the average recovery after trial in
city courts may be less than three thousand dollars, information concerning the average demand or the distribution of demands is unavailable.
Such data are necessary in estimating the number of cases which could
be diverted from the courts to arbitration. It is probable that a maximum
of five thousand dollars or more should govern the area of compulsory
arbitration. Perhaps a screening procedure to test the validity of the
amount demanded should also be part of the program, so that a fictitiously
inflated demand would not automatically be channelled to the courts.
These as well as other considerations will require appraisal as the plan
is perfected and its implementation in other areas of the state becomes a
possibility.
Another alternative is to arbitrate all personal injury claims arising
from automobile accidents."' 3 It is submitted that if this approach is
adopted, compensation should not be according to a schedule (as is the
case in Workmen's Compensation), but rather directed to reimbursement
134
of net economic loss.
Finally, consideration could be given to a combination of arbitration
for claims under five thousand or seventy-five hundred dollars, together
with a panel-court such as Justice Hofstadter suggested. 133 The advantage
would lie in permitting complex personal injury cases to be heard and
decided by a bench which includes a highly qualified and impartial
physician. The tripartite participation of lay judgment and judicial and
scientific expertise brings together the essential elements for a fair and
comprehensive trial of difficult controversies.
The possibilities presented above do not exhaust the innovations in
trial structure or forum which might be proposed to accelerate personal
injury litigation. The legal profession and the legislature have taken a
major step by supporting compulsory arbitration of small claims, while
judges and court administrators continue to pursue and perfect many
techniques to reduce delay in the courts. These efforts could not be more
timely, first because the crisis in criminal justice demands the maximum
133. See the proposal for a Federal Highway Compensation Statute in Hofstadter &
Pesner, A National Compensation Plan for Automobile Accident Cases, 22 Record of
N.Y.C.B.A. 615, 616 (1967).

134.

See id. at 617; N.Y. Ins. Dep't, Automobile Insurance.

85-89 (1970).

135.

See text accompanying note 128 supra.
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utilization of judge-time and court facilities, and secondly, because substantive changes in the automobile accident compensation system are on
the horizon. A more equitable scheme of accident reparation demands as
a counterpart an efficient and speedy process of adjudication. If courts
and court-supervised arbitration are to constitute the forums for accident
claims in the future, present efforts to master the backlog cannot abate,
but instead must be supplemented by an imaginative search for improvements in traditional trial processes.

